UAV defence moves beyond standalone systems

Unmanned aerial vehicles are part of this shift. While they can strike physical targets, their growing impact lies in how they interfere with the systems that keep infrastructure running.

This is not a theoretical change. It is being shaped in real time by companies operating in active conflict environments, where technologies are deployed, tested, and adapted under constant pressure. One of them is Kvertus, a Ukrainian developer of signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic warfare systems, whose solutions are currently used by the Ukrainian Defence Forces.

At the upcoming Evertiq Expo Kraków on 7 May, Kvertus CEO Yaroslav Filimonov will address this evolving landscape in his presentation, “Protecting Cities and Critical Infrastructure from UAVs: How to Build a Modern Defence Architecture.” His focus is not on individual tools, but on a broader question: how to design systems that can keep working as the threat itself keeps changing.

At the core of the challenge is a widening gap between how protection systems have traditionally been designed and how threats now behave.

Modern UAV threats are not static. They shift frequencies, modify protocols, and adapt their behaviour in ways that make fixed configurations quickly outdated. In this environment, the idea of a finished, long-life product is becoming obsolete.

“Designing today is no longer about creating a final product meant to last for years, but about maintaining a continuous update cycle,” Filimonov says.

This shift has immediate consequences. Systems that cannot be updated quickly – or that rely on fixed assumptions about how a threat operates – risk becoming ineffective soon after deployment.

The limits of standalone systems

Despite this, many existing protection setups still rely on fragmented architectures. Detection, analysis, and response are often handled by separate subsystems, each operating with limited coordination.

Individually, these components may perform well. Together, they introduce delays, blind spots, and, in some cases, interference with one another.

“When each system operates separately, without a shared control logic, this creates not only gaps in protection, but also the risk of mutual interference,” Filimonov explains.

What was once a manageable limitation has become a defining weakness. In a fast-moving threat environment, fragmentation directly reduces effectiveness.

The response is a shift away from standalone countermeasures toward integrated defence architectures.

Instead of isolated tools, the focus is moving toward interconnected systems that operate within a shared control framework, coordinate responses in real time, receive continuous software updates and can scale without a proportional increase in personnel.

“The focus is now shifting toward ecosystems — interconnected solutions operating within a unified control framework,” Filimonov says.

This marks a deeper change in how the problem itself is defined. Protecting infrastructure from UAVs is no longer just about detecting or neutralising individual threats. It is about maintaining continuous awareness, processing large volumes of signal data, and coordinating responses across multiple layers.

Technologies such as SIGINT, passive RF detection, and signal classification are no longer supporting elements. They form the backbone of the system.

War as a development environment

Nowhere is this shift more visible than in Ukraine. Systems that were once developed and tested in controlled conditions are now exposed to constant real-world adaptation. Adversaries modify firmware, shift frequencies, and adjust tactics in near real time, compressing development cycles from years to weeks.

“The frontline has become part of the development cycle,” Filimonov says. “It does not just test solutions – it forces them to evolve.”

This environment leaves little room for static design assumptions. Systems must be built to adapt continuously, or they risk becoming obsolete almost as soon as they are deployed.

Beyond the battlefield

As cities and infrastructure become more connected, these challenges extend beyond military contexts. Civilian systems are increasingly exposed to the same dynamics: complex dependencies, evolving vulnerabilities, and the need for coordinated protection.

In this context, the central challenge is no longer technological in isolation. It is architectural.

Effective defence depends on how well systems are integrated, how quickly they can be updated, and how reliably they can operate together under changing conditions.

Electronic warfare, once seen as a supporting capability, is becoming a foundational layer in this architecture – particularly in countering large volumes of low-cost aerial threats.

Filimonov’s presentation in Kraków reflects this shift. Rather than focusing on individual technologies, it addresses how those technologies must be combined, managed, and continuously adapted within a unified system